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1, Introduction 
In an earlier paper ("Alternative Theories of Wage Determination 
and Unemployment in L.D.C.'s: I. The Labor Turnover Model") we argued 
that to determine the desirability of such coumionly rccoromended policies 
for alleviating urban unemployment as subsidizing wages or using a shadow 
price of labor that is less than the market wage required an explicit model 
of the determination of wages and unemployment in L.D.C.'s. We presented 
a model there in which firms in the urban sector pay a wage higher than 
the rural wage in order to reduce labor turnover; we showed that in that 
models a wage subsidy actually lowered national output and increased the 
unemployment rate; and the "correct" shadow price of labor was, at least 
in some circumstances, just the urban wage. Some observers have suggested 
that labor turnover is one of the more important determinants of firms' 
I 
wage policy in East Africa, and if this is the case, our results certainly 
call into question the advisability of providing a wage subsidy and using 
low shadow prices for labor in such economies. On the other hand, de-
velopment economists in South Asia have favored an alternative explanation 
of the phenomena of urban unemployment: the efficiency wage model, which 
2 
dates back at least to the work of Leibenstein. In spite of its common 
"This paper was written while the author was a research fellow at the Insti 
tute for Development Studies, University of Nairobi (1969-1971) under a 
grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. The author is indebted to his col-
leagues at the IDS for many helpful discussions; in particular, he would 
like to thank G.E. Johnson and L. Smith. Financial support was also provic 
by the Ford Foundation and the National Science Foundation. 
1
Cf, W. Elkan, Migrants and Proletarians, Oxford University Press, 1960, a; 
An African Labor Force, East African Studies, Vo. 7, Kampala, 1955. 
2 
H, Leibenstein, Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth, July, 1957. 
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acceptance, ^  there appears to be no general equilibrium analysis of its 
implications, particularly its policy implications for wage subsidies and 
shadow prices, This paper provides such an analysis. 
An analysis of the implications of the efficiency wage for urban 
wages and employment requires, however, a detailed examination of the rural 
sector. Part A of this paper describes the rural sector and Part B links 
these results with the urban sector. 
A* The Rural Sector 
The economics of the rural sector — the allocation of labor, the supply 
of effort, the determinants of migration from the rural to the urban sector, 
etc.--depends critically on hoxj the sector is organized, for instance, whether 
farms are individually owned or whether there are extended families, whether 
there is a large landless peasantry, whether individuals who migrate to 
2 
the urban sector lose their rights to the land, etc. For most of the analysis 
of this part of the paper, we shall assume land is owned by an extended 
family. We shall consider a variety of rules according to which food is 
allocated to the members of the family: in Section 2, we shall consider 
one "polar case"--one which plays a prominant role in the literature--where 
everyone receives his average product and efficiency considerations are 
completely ignored, while in Section 3 we shall describe the other polar 
case, where distribution is completely ignored and the farm maximizes 
its output. The analysis of Sections 2 and 3 will make clear that there 
are conflicts between equity and efficiency: the output in the equalitarian 
situation where everyone receives the same wage may be significantly lower 
than in the output maximizing solution. Moreover, in the completely equali-
tarian situation the social marginal product of an individual is negative: 
as individuals migrate from the rural sector, output actually increases. 
We do not wish to discuss here the direct empirical evidence in support 
of and against this model; we shall note, however, that the model does cor-
rectly describe many aspects of the labor market in L.D.C.'s, 
2 
For a more extended treatment of these issues, see J
S
E= Stiglitz, "Rural-
Urban Migration, Surplus Labor, and the Relationship between Urban and Rural 
Wages," E, African Econ. Rev,, Dec. 1969. 
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The analyses of Sections 2 and 3 are both special cases of the more general 
analysis of Section 4 where the family maximizes family "welfare" according 
to an additive (Benthamite) welfare function, i.e. the family takes cogni-
zance of the trade-off between efficiency and equity. It is still true in 
this case that the social marginal product of an individual is negative. 
Different members of the family will receive different wages, but we are 
able to establish certain bounds on the degree of inequality. In particular, 
we can think of each individual's receipts as his marginal product plus a 
pro rata share of rents. The low wage individuals are less efficient than 
the high wage individuals; they receive less than their share of the rents 
pro-rated on the basis of percentage of the population, but more than their 
share of the rents pro-rated on the basis of percentage contribution to 
total effective labor supply. 
In the final section of Part A, we describe the rural sector of an 
economy with landless laborers. Working individuals have a positive mar-
ginal product, but there may be unemployment; this is an equilibrium, i.e. 
the unemployed are unable to bid down the wages of the employed, It will 
be shown that the wage io identical to-that of output maximizing family 
farm described in Section 3, 
The models of this section show that presence of a positive wage 
for working individuals in a competitive labor market (and a corresponding 
positive marginal productivity) cannot be taken as evidence that labor is 
not in surplus (as some authors seem to have done); indeed in Sections 3 
and 4, the laborers actually have a negative social marginal product although 
they receive a positive wage. 
2. The Equalitarian Family Farm 
Output in the representative farm in the rural sector is a function 
of the input of labor services, land, capital, and other factors of produc-
tion. In this paper, we focus only on labor; all other factors of production 
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are assumed to be fixed in the short run. The efficiency wage hypothesis 
says that the services a laborer renders are a function of the wage he 
receives. One well-paid worker may do what two poorly paid workers can do. 
We let X,(w) be the index of efficiency of a worker receiving a wage of 
2 
w . We hypothesize that \ has the shape depicted in; Figure 1. There is 
a region of increasing returns, where, as the individual is brought above 
the "starvation" level additional increments in wages result increasing 
increments in efficiency^ although eventually diminishing returns sets in. 
Although many observers have claimed that the efficiency curve has the shape 
depicted, direct empirical evidence is hard to come by and it remains a 
moot question, It should be emphasized that our results do depend critically 3 on the existence of the initial region of increasing returns. 
Since everyone receives the same wage (i„e, they receive the average 
product) total labor services, E , are given by 
E = \(w)L (2.1) 
where L is the number of workers, Output on the farm is given by 
Q = G(E) = G(X(w)L) (2.2) 
where G
1
 > 0 , G" < 0 , there is a positive marginal product and diminishing 
returns to labor services. Since workers receive their average product 
w = Q/L . (2.3) 
The nature of the equilibrium is depicted in Figure 2. At a given level 
of L , output per man is initially an increasing function of w and then 
a decreasing function of w , Equilibrium requires output per man to equal w , 
Most of our results will still be true in the more general case where these 
other factors are allowed to vary, as they certainly will in the long run; 
our primary interest here is in the short run analysis (rather than with 
capital accumulation, or intereectoral capital movements) and hence the as-
sumption of other factors being fixed may not be unreasonable. In any case, 
the more general analysis would obfuscate the simple points we wish to 
establish here, 
2 
Since Part A is concerned exclusively with the rural sector, we need not 
burden ourselves here with distinguishing between w , the wage in the rural 
and w , the urban wage, or V and X , In Part B, subscripts will be 
u t u ' 
required, 
3 
We return to the remark made in footnote 1, p, 2 above: although the assump-
tions of the model are hard to verify directly, many of its implications are 
roughly in accord with the observed patterns of wages and employment. 
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Consider now the effect of an increase in the number of laborers, 
L ; clearly at each value of w , the output per man diminishes (because 
of diminishing returns); as the dotted line in Figure 2a makes clear, out-
put per man (and hence the wage) is reduced. But not only does an increase 
in the number of laborers reduce output per man, but it actually may reduce 
total output, as Figure 2b illustrates. To see this, we take the logarithmic 
derivative of (2.3) to obtain 
where a = G
!
E/G ; the imputed share of labor, i.e. the share of labor if 
marginal productivity pricing were used. 
The point where X® = \/w plays a central role in the subsequent 
discussion. In Figure 1, it is the point where a line through the origin 
is tamgent. to the efficiency curve. It has the property that ' "wage pay-
ments per effective unit of labor " are minimized there, i.e. the solution to 
We shall call the solution to (2,5b) w* , and refer to it as the "effi-
ciency wage," 
Our concern here, of course, is with economies which are sufficiently 
poor that w < w" , so the social marginal productivity of a laborer is 
2 
negative * 
It should be clear, however, that although the social marginal pro-
ductivity of a laborer in the rural sector is negative, the apparent "private" 
marginal productivity, G'X , is positive, Each person is contributing 
something on the margin to production. It is only the fact that his presence 
in the rural sector decreases the income per capita, and hence the producti-
vity of the other workers in the rural sector, that makes his social marginal 
productivity negative, 
3, The Income Maximizing Family 
We shall now consider the extended family which allocates its income 
among its members so as to maximize family income, paying no attention to 
equityJ If P(w) is the percentage of the family workers receiving at 
least a wage of w , then the effective labor supply E , of the family 
. . 3,4 
IS just 
E = LJ\(w)dP(w) . (3,1) 
To maximize family income, G(E) , we simply maximize E subject 
to the constraint that 
•"•Since d In w/d In L = -(l-a)/(l - (aX'w/X)) < 0 , and a < 1 , it is 
clear that Q V w / X < 1 . 
2 
This argument is very different for that presented by Stiglitz, "Rural-
Urban Migration^.o" op.cit. and A,K< Sen, "Peasants and Dualism with or 
without Surplus Labor," JPE, 74 (Oct, 1966), 425-50, where the social physical 
marginal productivity may be negative because with reduced population, workers 
work harder, and output actually may increase, 
3 
The integral is best interpreted as a Stieltjes integral, 
4 
In most of the subsequent discussion, we shall let P(w) take on any values 
between zero and one; obviously, if there are L individuals in the family, 
P can only take on values 1/L , 2/L , etc=, the slight loss in realism 
is more then compensated for by the gain in analytic tractability» 
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4. Maximization on Family Welfare 
Obviously, the allocation of income among the members of the family 
described in the previous section, which leaves a proportion of the family 
with no wages, is probably unacceptable: most families would insist on 
supporting even their unproductive members at some, perhaps sub-subsistance 
level. This will, of course, reduce the total family income. One way of 
"capturing" the family trade-off between equity and efficiency is for the 
family to maximize a family welfare function. Let V(w) be the utility 
1 
associated with an income of w , We wish to 
max (V(w)dP(w) (4,1) 
subject to the income constraint (3c2), Our approach to solving this prob-
lem will be similar to that employed in Section 3. We first ascertain if 
wage levels w^ and w
n
 are paid to different individuals, what relations 
must exist between w^ and w^ . We shall show that although there is 
only one level of wages that can be paid that exceeds w , the point of 
inflection in the efficiency curve (see Figure 1), there may be many dif-
ferent wage levels paid to the "unproductive" (i,e. those for whom w < w ). 
We then simplify the problem to assume that there is only one low produc-
tivity wage. We let w^ be the low wage, w^ be the high wage. We then 
establish the following propositions: 
__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _______ 
It is obvious that if V is linear, i„e„ V(w) = a + bw , then maximi-
zation of (4,1) is equivalent to maximizing 
fwdP(w) 
which, by (3,2), is equivalent to maximizing G(E) , family output. If 
V(w) is of the form -w
 0
 , then maximizing 
-|w~
p
dP(w) 
is equivalent to maximizing 
- 1 / e 
[fw"
P
dP(w)J 
and in the limit, as Q 09 , this approaches 
min w 
i,e, we obtain the completely equalitarian solution of section 2, where 
everyone receives his average product. 
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19 
the wage is equal to the marginal productivity, while in the family farm, 
the wage is equal to the average product of the working members of the 
family: 
(where p is the proportion of the family working). Clearly, there is less 
employment and output in the plantation economy than in the output maximizing 
family farm. (See Figure 9.) 
There is one objection which may be raised to this analysis, if the 
reasons for the efficiency curve is, at least partially, nutritional rather 
than psychological, and the workers on the plantation share their income with 
non working or poorer relatives, the landlord will reap, through the increased 
efficiency of his workers, only a part of the benefits of paying high wages. 
The implications of these sharing arrangements are discussed in Section 10„ 
PART B 
We now return to the original objective of our study, the analysis 
of urban employment and the impact of various government wage and employ-
ment policies. 
As we noted earlier, the effects of these policies depend critically 
on the nature of the rural sector, in particular, on whether there is a 
surplus of laborers (as we have, discussed it in the preceding part) in agri-
culture. Sections 6-8 are concerned with an economy in which there is not 
a surplus of labor; Section 6 presents the basic model and describes the 
competitive equilibrium; Section 7 describes the second best situation where 
the government cannot control migration but sets the urban wage and employ-
ment levels optimally; while Section 8 describes the "third best" situation 
where the government uses wage subsidies to induce firms to hire more workers. 
Section 9 extends these results to economies in which there is a surplus 
of laborers. Section 10 considers the complications introduced by "sharing." 




( 

is the elasticity of demand for labor in the rural sector. Empirically, 
(o(l°U) appears to be greater than or equal t© unitys so that the shadow 
price of labor is less than the urban wage. How much less depends ©n the 
elasticity of demand for labor and the magnitude of cp(l=U) - 1 . If hiring 
one more worker in the urban area results in some migration from the rural 
area,, which raises the rural, wage,, the unemployment rate will be reduced. 
The smaller T]„ » the more the unemployment rate is reduced^ hence the 
lower the loss in output due to induced unemployment; this effect is more 
important the larger the urban sector is relative to the rural sector. If 
hiring one more urban worker results in 1/1°U workers migrating from the 
rural sector and if the marginal product ©f a rural worker is - w^ /ep 
clearly the loss in rural output (ignoring the effect on the unemployment 
rate) is w /cp(l~U) < 1 as cp(l-U) > 1 . (Thus,, if w^ ® w^/l-U , the 
loss in output is just the rural wage.) This effect is probably quantitatively 
more important than the effect on the unemployment rate,, as we shall note 
in more detail below. 
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For instance, in the special case where 
(10.6) cp(l/l-U) = 1/1-U 
then 
(10.3
s
) w
f
 =
 w
* . 
Competitive equilibrium will require that the rural wage be equal to w , 
More generally, since cp(l/l~U) (1-U) > 1 , w^ < wf . In our numerical 
example (p. 25) with to - 1«5 when U = . 2 ,
 w
r
 =
 (T
 W
u '
 a n <
^
 W
u
=
 •'••^ Sw* • 
The rest of the market equilibrium is easy to describe* For simplicity, 
we assume there is no efficiency curve in the rural sector (i.e. we revert 
to the model of Sections 6-8). In the special case when (10.6) is true, so 
w
r
 - }
 a t
 that wage there is a given "employment" in ^ the rural sector, 
A 
L
r
 . Hence, the number of individuals in the urban sector is just 
L s
 _ it 
L - L
r
 = N
u
 -
 1 = u
 . 
Substituting in from (10.3), we obtain 
(10.7) w*(L® - L
r
) = L
u
w
u
 . 
The R.H.S. of (10.7 ) is an increasing, constant, or decreasing function 
of w^ as the elasticity of demand for labor is less than, equal to, or 
greater than unity in the urban sector. In the "normal case" say with a 
Cobb-Douglas production function, the equilibrium will be depicted as in 
Figure 12a, 
As Figure 12d makes clear, it is possible that there be no equilibrium 
in this economy. At w^ = w* , there is an excess supply of workers. As the 
workers migrate into the urban sector, firms increase the wage they pay 
workers to get the optimal level of efficiency and because of the increased 
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optimality requires full employment, (13b) illustrates such a case, while 
(13a) illustrates a case where there is no full employment equilibrium. 
The optimal wage is then given at E with the corresponding optimal level 
of unemployment. The competitive solution may entail either too high or 
too low a wage; but in any case the shadow price of labor in the urban 
sector is less than the urban wage (provided (l-U)ep < 1 , as we have 
assumed earlier) and indeed, normally even less than the rural wage. 
The reason for the ambiguity is that the competitor ignores two 
effects of increasing his wage and employment. Both of these result from 
the fact that as he increases the urban wage, the unemployment rate changes. 
Because there is more urban employment in the optimal allocation than in 
the competitive allocation, at any given urban wage, there is less unemploy-
ment (since the rural wage is higher); hence not only are workers more 
productive, but the return to increasing wages is higher, since there are 
fewer among whom to share the wage increase. This leads to a higher wage 
in the optimal situation as compared to the competitive situation. On the 
other hand, the competitor ignores the fact that as he (and all other like-
minded firms) increases his wages., he Increases the unemployment rate, so 
there is a significant loss in output from the induced migration from the 
rural sector. 
In analyzing these effects of a wage subsidy, we must consider se-
parately two different cases. 
(a) An equilibrium exists with a finite level of unemployment; there, a 
wage subsidy increases the demand for labor at each value of w , hence 
increases the equilibrium unemployment rate, as depicted in Figure 14. 
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If P = 1 , ""normally
8
® there is a small subsidy. 
(b) At zero unemployment, there is an excess supply of individuals, so 
no static equilibrium exists (see above, p. 31). Then optimality requirea 
imposing a wage subsidy to shift the
 W
U
L
U
 higher up until the equilibrium 
occurs at U - 0 « If P < 1 further increases in the subsidy do not in-
crease rural output and, by increasing U decrease urban output. Even 
if P > 1 , provided cp(l) = 1 , further increases in the subsidy decrease 
output.* 
11. Concluding Comments on the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis 
The arguments for the "efficiency" wage hypothesis are broader than 
just the simple dependence of productivity on nutrition. Indeed, if that 
were the primary explanation, one would expect that firms would provide 
housing and food for their workers, to ensure that the worker, and not other 
members of his family receive the benefits of the "high" wag®, and that 
workers did not.foolishly spend their money on unnutritious food. Even 
though food expenditures do increase with income, there is little evidence 
that the nutritional value of food expenditures increases; rather the worker 
may switch to more expensive but from a nutritional point of view, less 
satisfactory, foods, There is in addition the "incentive" effects of a 
higher wage; because they receive a higher wage, workers believe they should 
put more "effort" (conversely, they may feel little effort is commensurate 
with a low wage), Henry Ford is said to have based his policy of high 
wages on this argument,, 
There are two respects in which the efficiency wage hypothesis and 
the labor turnover hypothesis discussed in our earlier paper are closely 
linked. First, not only is "quitting" affected by the wage rate, but 
cp(l) is much greater than unity, if P > 1 , further increases in 
unemployment by increasing the wage subsidy may be desirable. 
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"absenteeism" is also affected. The "cost" of being fired as a result of 
absenteeism (or other unproductive behavior like stealing) is greater the 
greater the unemployment rate, the urban rural wage differential, and the 
wage differential between the given firm and other firms in the urban sector. 
In this respect, the conditions for optimal efficiency depend on exactly the 
same factors that labor turnover does. 
Secondly, at sufficiently high urban wages, there may be a marked 
change in individual's behavior; workers may essentially sever their con-
nections with the rural sector and become part of the "urban proletariat." 
Labor turnover will then no longer be affected by further increases in the 
urban rural wage differential (although it still will depend on the unemploy-
ment rate and intra-urban wage differentials.) This introduces a non-convexity 
into the firm behavior with many of the same implications that the non-convexity 
in the "efficiency wage" function discussed above. (See Figure 15.) 
The major conclusions to be drawn from our analysis of the efficiency 
wage hypothesis are the following: 
(1) If efficiency in the rural sector is not affected by income 
levels there and if the expected urban wage equals the rural wage, then if 
the marginal productivity of labor in the rural sector is constant, the 
competitive equilibrium is identical to the optimal allocation, even though 
there is unemployment. If there is diminishing returns in the rural sector, 
the efficiency wage is still the optimal wage, but the competitive allocation 
will involve too few workers in the urban sector and too high an unemployment 
rate. The shadow price of labor will in general lie between the rural and 
urban wages. 
(2) Unlike the labor turnover model, provided there is no sharing, 
the wage subsidy is not shifted and a wage subsidy will increase national 
income. 
(3) If workers share their wage income with non-workers (or rural 
workers), the competitive wage will be higher (than if they do not share). 
As a polar case, if they share their income equally with all the unemployed, 
the competitive wage will be the efficiency wage divided by 1-U . 
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(4) If there is sharing, a wage subsidy may increase the unemploy-
ment rate and reduce rational output; in some circumstances, a wage tax 
is desirable, in others a wage subsidy is called for. 
(5) If the efficiency in the rural sector is affected by income levels 
there, there will be a trade-off between employment and output in the rural 
1 2 
sector, and between output and income distribution. ' These trade-offs are 
illustrated by the following special cases: 
(a) If land is owned by a "landlord" class, which maximizes its profits 
(rents), then there will be true unemployment, even though those who work 
receive a positive wage (and have a positive marginal product equal to that 
wage). The competitive wage is the rural efficiency wage. 
(b) If workers receive their average product, and all peasants are 
treated identically, then the social marginal product of a laborer in the 
rural sector is negative. The competitive wage in the urban sector is optimal,, 
but optimality requires hiring workers in the urban sector at least to the 
point where the social marginal product of workers in the rural sector is 
positive. 
(c) If families maximize their family income, there will again be 
true surplus laborers. Those who work receive their average product which 
is equal to the agricultural "efficiency wage"; those who do not receive 
nothing, 
(d), If families maximize their family utility, described by an additive 
utility function with diminishing marginal utility, the family will again 
be divided into two groups--hard workers and easy workers. Hard workers 
^In conventional economic models, there is not a tradeoff between employment 
and output as long as workers can be put to work without doing harm to the 
output of other workers. 
2 
This should be distinguished from the conventional models, which allow for 
a trade-off between employment (output, income distribution) and economic 
growth. In the long run, these models yield the result that if savings 
are dependent on the distribution of income, hiring more workers today will 
result in greater output today and more equality today (smaller profits), 
but less employment and output in the future. Here however we are concerned 
completely with static results: at each moment of time there is this trade-
off. 
39 
will receive less than the efficiency wage; but an income greater than the 
wage of the point of inflection of the efficiency curve; easy workers will 
receive a positive wage in the convex region of the efficiency curve. The 
"hard workers" receive a share of the rent more than proportionate to their 
numbers but less than proportionate to their contribution to output. The 
size of the wage "gap" increases as the number of workers in the rural sector 
increases. The social marginal productivity of workers in the rural sector 
is negative (even though all individuals receive some wages and do some work). 
It is optimal to have a sufficiently large wage subsidy to lead to 
full employment in the rural sector, but not to full employment in the urban 
sector. 
The results of this model stand in marked contrast to those of the 
labor turnover model. There were noted a presumption that a wage subsidy 
would be shifted, would increase urban unemployment and reduce national 
output. Here, we note that except in one case, although a potentially an 
important one (where workers share their income with non-workers), a subsidy 
is desirable. Other implications of this model differ markedly from those 
of the labor turnover model. The efficiency wage model predicts that the 
urban real wage remain roughly constant;in the labor turnover model, if the 
unemployment rate were constant, the urban real wage would move in the same 
direction as the rural wage. Accordingly, if the economy is successful in 
its development program and the rural wage beings to rise, the urban wage 
will rise as well. 
In the final part of this paper, we explore too other models of wage 
determination: a Cambridge-type Distribution Model and the Rigid Wage 
Hypothesis. 
